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____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal arises under the Medicare as a Secondary 
Payer Act (MSP Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2). Appellant 
Cecelia A. Taransky, a Medicare beneficiary, contends that 
she is not required to reimburse the Government
1
 for 
conditional medical expenses that it advanced on her behalf. 
We disagree. 
I 
Medicare is a federal entitlement program that 
provides health insurance benefits to qualified elderly and 
disabled individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2). When first 
enacted, Medicare paid its beneficiaries’ medical expenses, 
even if beneficiaries could recoup them from other sources, 
such as private health insurance. See, e.g., Zinman v. Shalala, 
67 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1995). 
                                                 
1
 Appellees in this case are the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, and the United 
States. For ease of reference, we refer to Appellees as the 
Government. 
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In 1980, Congress enacted the MSP Act in an effort to 
reduce escalating costs. As its title suggests, the statute 
designates Medicare as a “secondary payer” of medical 
benefits, and thus precludes the program from providing such 
benefits when a “primary plan” could be expected to pay. 42 
U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A). When the primary plan cannot 
promptly pay a beneficiary’s medical expenses, however, 
Medicare makes conditional payments to ensure that the 
beneficiary receives timely care. Id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B). Once 
“the beneficiary gets the health care she needs . . . Medicare is 
entitled to reimbursement if and when the primary payer pays 
her.” Cochran v. U.S. Health Care Fin. Admin., 291 F.3d 775, 
777 (11th Cir. 2002). 
This appeal involves, inter alia, the interaction of the 
MSP Act with a state law, the New Jersey Collateral Source 
Statute (NJCSS), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15–97. Under the 
NJCSS, a tort plaintiff cannot recover damages from a 
defendant when she has already received funding from a 
different source. The statute provides:  
In any civil action brought for personal injury or 
death . . . if a plaintiff receives or is entitled to 
receive benefits for the injuries allegedly 
incurred from any other source other than a 
joint tortfeasor, the benefits, other than workers’ 
compensation benefits or the proceeds from a 
life insurance policy, shall be disclosed to the 
court and the amount thereof which duplicates 
any benefit contained in the award shall be 
deducted from any award recovered by the 
plaintiff, less any premium paid to an insurer 
directly by the plaintiff or by any member of the 
plaintiff’s family on behalf of the plaintiff for 
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the policy period during which the benefits are 
payable. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15–97 (emphasis added). 
The NJCSS has two purposes. First, it prevents a tort 
plaintiff from recovering damages from both a collateral 
source of benefits (i.e., a health insurer) and a tortfeasor. 
Parker v. Esposito, 677 A.2d 1159, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996). Second, it aims to shift the burden of 
medical costs related to tort injuries, whenever possible, from 
liability insurers to health insurers, and thereby keep liability 
insurance premiums down. Lusby v. Hitchner, 642 A.2d 1055, 
1061 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). In this appeal, 
Taransky contends that because the NJCSS barred her from 
recovering medical costs from her tortfeasor, it would be 
inappropriate for her to reimburse the Government for its 
conditional medical payments. 
A 
Taransky was injured on November 7, 2005, when she 
tripped and fell at the Larchmont Shopping Center in Mt. 
Laurel, New Jersey. The Medicare program conditionally 
paid $18,401.41 for her medical care. 
Almost two years later, Taransky filed suit against the 
owners and operators of the shopping center (collectively, 
Larchmont) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington 
County, seeking damages for bodily injury, disability, pain 
and suffering, emotional distress, economic loss, and medical 
expenses. Shortly after filing suit, Taransky’s lawyer 
contacted her designated Medicare contractor repeatedly, 
requesting the exact amount of Medicare’s claim. In one 
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letter, counsel complained: “I cannot negotiate the case unless 
I know the full amount of Medicare’s claim.” JA at 295. In 
another, he stated: “I would like to try to resolve Ms. 
Taransky’s claim, but will have difficulty doing so without 
knowledge of Medicare’s lien and its benefit payments in this 
matter.” JA at 307. On several occasions, the Medicare 
contractor provided Taransky’s counsel with information 
about Medicare’s conditional payments, which continued to 
accumulate as Taransky’s lawsuit proceeded.  
After two years of litigation, Taransky settled her 
claims against Larchmont for $90,000. In the settlement 
agreement, she granted Larchmont a full release of “all past, 
present and future claims,” including for “medical treatment” 
and for “medical expense benefits” in connection with the 
accident. JA at 271. The agreement also provided that any 
liens or subrogation claims would be “satisfied and 
discharged from the settlement proceeds,” and that Taransky 
would indemnify Larchmont with respect to such claims. Id. 
Relevant to this case, the agreement provided that the 
indemnified liens “specifically include[], but [are] not limited 
to, Medicare, Medicaid, workers compensation liens and/or 
claims.” Id. 
On the heels of the settlement, Taransky filed a motion 
in the New Jersey Superior Court requesting an order 
“apportioning the proceeds of the settlement between various 
elements of damages, but only to the extent necessary to 
obtain specified documentation relevant to anticipated 
administrative proceedings with the federal Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.” JA at 267. Taransky 
acknowledged that her lawsuit had sought damages for 
“certain expenses for medical treatment,” and that some of 
her treatment “was paid for through the federal government’s 
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Medicare program.” Id. In spite of these facts, Taransky 
argued that the NJCSS precluded tort plaintiffs like herself 
from recovering losses such as medical expenses that were 
already paid by another source. Based on that premise, she 
claimed that her Medicare expenses were not considered in 
the settlement negotiations and were not included in the 
settlement amount. JA at 268. Taransky’s counsel notified her 
Medicare contractor of the motion, but did not make the 
contractor or the Government a party to her state court case. 
Neither Larchmont nor the Government responded to 
Taransky’s motion.  
On November 20, 2009, the Superior Court granted 
Taransky’s motion and entered an order for “good cause 
shown,” stating that the settlement did not include any 
Medicare expenses: “[N]o portion of the recovery obtained by 
[Taransky] in this matter is attributable to medical expenses 
or other benefits compensated by way of a collateral source.” 
JA at 260, 261. The order specified that the settlement 
amount was “allocated solely to recovery for bodily injury, 
disability, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and such 
non-economic and otherwise-uncompensated loss as plaintiff 
may have suffered.” JA at 261. 
B 
After Taransky settled her case, a Medicare contractor 
demanded reimbursement of the $10,121.15 that the Medicare 
program had paid on her behalf.
2
 Taransky refused to pay, 
                                                 
2
 Medicare’s requested reimbursement deducted a 
proportionate share of Taransky’s attorneys’ fees and the 
incidental costs of procuring the settlement. 
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citing the NJCSS and the allocation order she had received 
from the Superior Court. She also contended that the 
Government could not demand reimbursement from a 
tortfeasor’s liability settlement under the MSP Act because a 
tortfeasor was not a “primary plan” under the meaning of the 
statute, and that reimbursement would be inequitable because 
she had not recovered any of her medical expenses. 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found against 
Taransky on all claims.
3
 The ALJ ruled that the Government 
could be reimbursed from the proceeds of a tort settlement, 
and refused to recognize the state court’s allocation order 
because it was not made “on the merits.” He also rejected 
Taransky’s contention that the NJCSS precluded the 
Government from reimbursement, reasoning that the NJCSS 
did not apply to Medicare’s conditional payments. Finally, 
the ALJ found that reimbursement would not be inequitable, 
as he was unconvinced that the settlement truly did not 
include damages for medical expenses.  
The Medicare Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s 
opinion in its entirety, writing separately only to expound on 
two points. First, it determined that the settlement in fact 
included damages for Taransky’s medical expenses, finding 
that Taransky’s counsel—who repeatedly demanded 
confirmation of the amount of Medicare’s lien—had used 
                                                 
3
 Before reaching the ALJ, Taransky appeared before 
the Medicare Secondary Recovery Contractor (the first level 
of appeal in the Medicare administrative process) and a 
Medicare Qualified Independent Contractor (QIC) (the 
second level of appeal), both of which held her liable for 
reimbursement. 
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Medicare’s payments as a basis for the settlement. Second, 
citing Mason v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 1019131 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 
2012), the Appeals Council ruled that the NJCSS did not 
preclude tort victims from obtaining damages for Medicare 
benefits in tort liability settlements.  
On July 16, 2012, Taransky filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, reiterating 
her claim that she was not responsible for reimbursing the 
Medicare program from the proceeds of her settlement. As 
she had argued during the administrative process, Taransky 
contended that reimbursement was unauthorized by the MSP 
Act and barred by the NJCSS. She also proffered two new 
arguments: (1) that Medicare’s recovery should be limited to 
a proportionate share of her settlement that reflected her 
medical expenses; and (2) that the Government’s refusal to 
acknowledge the Superior Court’s allocation order violated 
her right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  
The Government moved to dismiss the complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, or in the 
alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court 
granted the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over 
Taransky’s proportionality and due process claims because 
she had failed to raise them before the agency. It also 
determined that the NJCSS did not apply to conditional 
Medicare benefits, and that the MSP Act authorized 
reimbursement from the settlement. 
This timely appeal followed. 
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II 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Taransky’s 
exhausted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 
1395ff(b).
4
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
We review the District Court’s dismissal order de 
novo. See Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d 
Cir. 2007). Like the District Court, we accept the agency’s 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence 
in the administrative record. Mercy Home Health v. Leavitt, 
436 F.3d 370, 377 (3d Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) 
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). We defer to the agency’s legal 
interpretation of its implementing statute under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837 (1984). See Leavitt, 436 F.3d at 377. 
III 
The reimbursement provision of the MSP Act 
provides:  
[A] primary plan, and an entity that receives 
payment from a primary plan, shall reimburse 
                                                 
4
 As discussed in section IV, infra, the District Court 
correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction over Taransky’s 
proportionality and due process arguments. 
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the appropriate Trust Fund for any payment 
made by the Secretary . . . with respect to an 
item or service if it is demonstrated that such a 
primary plan has or had a responsibility to make 
payment with respect to such item or service. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphases added). 
Taransky contends that the MSP Act does not 
authorize the Government to be reimbursed for conditional 
Medicare payments from the proceeds of a tortfeasor’s 
liability settlement. She advances three primary arguments on 
appeal. First, she contends that a tortfeasor cannot be 
considered a “primary plan” from which the Government may 
receive payment under the MSP Act. Next, she argues that the 
Government failed to prove that Larchmont had a 
“demonstrated responsibility” to pay her medical expenses, as 
the NJCSS prohibited her from obtaining damages for 
medical expenses as part of the tort settlement. Finally, she 
insists that the Government had to defer to the state court 
order apportioning the settlement to exclude medical 
expenses. We address each argument in turn.  
A 
Taransky claims that a tortfeasor’s liability settlement 
is not a “primary plan” within the meaning of the MSP Act, 
citing only one relevant case: Mason v. American Tobacco 
Co., 346 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2003). In Mason, the Second Circuit 
found that an entity could be a primary plan under the MSP 
Act only if it had a preexisting obligation to provide health 
benefits—for example, via a contract to provide health 
insurance. Id. at 42. The court ruled that “the trigger for 
bringing a MSP claim is not the pendency of a disputed tort 
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claim, but the established obligation to pay medical costs 
pursuant to a pre-existing arrangement to provide insurance 
benefits.” Id. at 43 (emphases added) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Following Mason, Taransky urges 
us to define “primary plan” to include only health insurance 
companies who have a preexisting contractual obligation to 
pay for medical expenses. 
Although Taransky’s description of Mason is accurate, 
she fails to acknowledge that the case was abrogated by the 
December 2003 amendments to the MSP Act, which 
explicitly broadened the definition of “primary plan” to 
include tortfeasors.
5
 See Bio-Medical Applications of Tenn., 
Inc. v. Central States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare 
Fund, 656 F.3d 277, 289–90 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining 
Congress’s intent to foreclose litigation on the definition of 
“primary plan” via the 2003 amendments). The statute as 
amended plainly includes tortfeasors and their insurance 
carriers in its definition of “primary plan”:  
                                                 
5
 Mason interpreted a version of the MSP statute that 
defined a “primary plan” to include a “self-insured plan,” but 
provided no guidance as to what constituted such a plan. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (2001), amended by Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173 § 301 (2003) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)). Before the 2003 
amendments, courts consistently rejected the Government’s 
argument that tortfeasors were “self-insured plans” because, 
rather than purchasing liability coverage from a separate 
insurance carrier, they assumed their own risk of liability. 
See, e.g., Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 495 (5th 
Cir. 2003); Mason, 346 F.3d at 42. 
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[T]he term “primary plan” [includes a] . . . 
liability insurance policy or plan (including a 
self-insured plan) or no fault insurance . . . . An 
entity that engages in a business, trade, or 
profession shall be deemed to have a self-
insured plan if it carries its own risk (whether 
by a failure to obtain insurance, or otherwise) in 
whole or in part. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The 
tortfeasor in Taransky’s case, Larchmont, is “[a]n entity that 
engages in a business, trade, or profession,” and the record 
demonstrates that it had a liability insurance policy. 
Accordingly, despite not having a preexisting obligation to 
pay for Taransky’s medical expenses, Larchmont is a primary 
plan from whose payments—the settlement amount—the 
Government may obtain reimbursement.
6
 
B 
Next, Taransky contends that the Government has 
failed to demonstrate, as a condition precedent for 
                                                 
6
 In a related argument, Taransky claims that the 
Government should not be reimbursed from her tort recovery, 
but should pursue a separate claim against Larchmont and its 
insurer. This is incorrect, however, because the MSP Act 
explicitly allows the Government to recoup payments either 
from the “primary plan” or “an entity that receives payment 
from a primary plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
Medicare’s “independent right of recovery [from the 
beneficiary] is separate and distinct from [its] right of 
subrogation.” Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845. 
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reimbursement, that Larchmont had a “responsibility to make 
payment” for her Medicare expenses. 42 U.S.C. § 
1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 
F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n alleged tortfeasor’s 
responsibility for payment of a Medicare beneficiary’s 
medical costs must be demonstrated before an MSP private 
cause of action for failure to reimburse Medicare can 
correctly be brought.”) (emphasis in original). 
The MSP Act provides that a beneficiary’s 
reimbursement obligation may be demonstrated by 
settlement: 
A primary plan’s responsibility for such 
payment may be demonstrated by . . . a payment 
conditioned upon the recipient’s compromise, 
waiver, or release (whether or not there is a 
determination or admission of liability) of 
payment for items or services included in a 
claim against the primary plan or the primary 
plan’s insured, or by other means. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added); see also 42 
C.F.R. § 411.22(b)(2). The Medicare Manual further 
provides: “Medicare policy requires recovering payments 
from liability awards or settlements . . . without regard to how 
the settlement agreement stipulates disbursements should be 
made. That includes situations in which the settlements do not 
expressly include damages for medical expenses.” MSP 
Manual, Ch. 7, § 50.4.4 (emphasis added).
7
 
                                                 
7
 Policy statements and interpretive rules, such as those 
included in the MSP Manual, do not have the force of law and 
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Like the other courts of appeals that have considered 
the issue, we hold that the fact of settlement alone, if it 
releases a tortfeasor from claims for medical expenses, is 
sufficient to demonstrate the beneficiary’s obligation to 
reimburse Medicare. See Hadden v. United States, 661 F.3d 
298, 302 (6th Cir. 2011); Mathis v. Leavitt, 554 F.3d 731, 733 
(8th Cir. 2009). For this reason, we adopt the Sixth Circuit’s 
analysis in Hadden, which held that “the scope of the plan’s 
‘responsibility’ for the beneficiary’s medical expenses—and 
thus of [the beneficiary’s] own obligation to reimburse 
Medicare—is ultimately defined by the scope of [the 
beneficiary’s] own claim against the third party” that is later 
released in settlement. 661 F.3d at 302 (emphasis in original). 
This rule comports with the text of the MSP Act and the 
Medicare Manual. It also ensures “a beneficiary cannot tell a 
third party that it is responsible for all of his medical 
expenses, on the one hand, and later tell Medicare that the 
same party was responsible for only [a compromise 
percentage] of them, on the other.” Id. 
Applying these principles, Taransky’s settlement—
which released Larchmont from all her claims, including 
those for medical expenses—renders her liable to the 
Government. In Mathis, the Eighth Circuit found that a 
beneficiary’s obligation under the MSP Act was triggered 
                                                                                                             
are not given Chevron deference. See Christensen v. Harris 
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Those statements do, 
however, “reflect ‘a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.’” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 
399 (2008) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 
(1998)). 
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even when the parties did not specifically address obligations 
to Medicare. 554 F.3d at 733. Here, Taransky’s settlement 
agreement expressly anticipated Medicare’s lien, and 
provided that reimbursement to the Medicare program would 
be “satisfied and discharged from the settlement proceeds.” 
JA at 271. There is also substantial evidence to support the 
agency’s factual finding that the settlement included the costs 
of Taransky’s medical care. Before entering into the 
settlement agreement, Taransky’s counsel repeatedly 
contacted her Medicare contractor to determine the amount of 
the program’s lien, so he could use the amount to justify her 
settlement demand. See, e.g., JA at 294 (stating counsel’s 
intent to “negotiate this case using [an estimate of Medicare’s 
benefits] as a basis for potential settlement”); JA at 295 (“I 
cannot negotiate the case unless I know the full amount of 
Medicare’s claim.”). After the settlement, counsel certified 
that Taransky’s lawsuit included “certain expenses for 
medical treatment,” and “[s]ome of the medical treatment for 
the personal injuries suffered by [Taransky] was paid for 
through the federal government’s Medicare program.” JA at 
267. Given the substantial evidence that Taransky was 
compensated for her medical costs, she cannot now hide 
behind the lump sum settlement to deprive the Government of 
the reimbursement it is owed.  
1 
In response, Taransky contends that her settlement 
amount could not have included her medical costs as a matter 
of law, as Medicare payments are a “collateral source” of 
benefits that may not be obtained from a tortfeasor under the 
NJCSS. It would follow that the MSP Act’s reimbursement 
provision was never triggered, and that the Government’s 
request—rather than preventing her from obtaining a double 
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recovery—would strip her of any recoupment of her medical 
expenses. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has not considered 
whether the NJCSS operates to prevent a plaintiff from 
recovering Medicare payments in a tort suit; thus, “we must 
attempt to predict how that tribunal would rule.” U.S. 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 90, 93 
(3d Cir. 1996). In doing so, we may consider the decisions of 
state intermediate appellate courts, which, “[a]lthough not 
dispositive, . . . should be accorded significant weight in the 
absence of an indication that the highest state court would 
rule otherwise.” Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 
1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Several decisions by the New Jersey Appellate 
Division inform our analysis. In Lusby, the Appellate 
Division held that the NJCSS did not bar the plaintiff from 
recovering his medical expenses as part of tort damages, even 
though those costs had been provisionally covered by the 
state Medicaid program. 642 A.2d at 1061. The court rested 
its decision on the statutory purpose of the NJCSS:  
The legislative determination . . . was 
apparently not only to prevent plaintiffs from 
obtaining a double recovery but also . . . to shift 
the burden, at least to some extent, from the 
liability and casualty insurance industry to 
health and disability third-party payers.  
We think it plain, however, that neither of these 
purposes is advanced by application of the 
collateral source statute where, as here, a 
plaintiff could not in any case pocket a double 
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recovery for medical expenses for the reason 
that his entire recovery is subject to Medicaid’s 
reimbursement rights.  
Id. (emphasis added). The court further emphasized that the 
NJCSS’s purposes were not served “when the ultimate burden 
is shifted from the tortfeasor’s liability carrier to a 
governmentally-funded secondary payer.” Id. Since Lusby, 
panels of the Appellate Division have consistently found that 
application of the NJCSS turns on whether the government 
benefits provided are reimbursable: if they are, then the 
payments are considered conditional, and are not collateral 
benefits that may not be recovered pursuant to the statute. 
Compare Thomas v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 660 A.2d 1236, 1246 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (finding that Social Security 
payments are a collateral source of benefits under the NJCSS 
because the government has no right to their reimbursement), 
with Woodger v. Christ Hosp., 834 A.2d 1047, 1051 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (“We have also held that benefits 
such as Medicaid, subject to reimbursement by the plaintiff to 
the payer from the proceeds of a negligence judgment or 
settlement, are similarly not includable as a collateral source 
because they do not constitute double recovery.”) (emphasis 
added). 
While Lusby involved a state Medicaid statute,
8
 its 
reasoning applies with equal force in the Medicare context. 
                                                 
8
 Under the state-law provision considered in Lusby, 
any recipient of Medicaid funds who brought a tort action 
against a third party 
shall immediately reimburse the division in full 
from the proceeds of any settlement, judgment, 
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The MSP Act makes clear that Congress intended the 
Medicare program to serve only as a secondary payer: 
Medicare may pay a beneficiary’s medical bills only if a 
primary plan cannot be expected to pay promptly, and 
beneficiaries are obligated to reimburse Medicare once a 
responsible primary plan has been identified. 42 U.S.C. § 
1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii); Fanning v. United States, 346 F.3d 386, 
388–89 (3d Cir. 2003). Medicare’s benefits, then, are 
reimbursable and conditional. For that reason, the NJCSS, 
which operates only when the beneficiary is “entitled to 
receive benefits” from another source, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:15–97, is inapplicable. 
As further support for this conclusion, the Appellate 
Division extended Lusby’s logic to Medicare payments in 
                                                                                                             
or other recovery in any action or claim initiated 
against any such third party subject to a pro rata 
deduction for counsel fees, costs, or other 
expenses incurred by the recipient or the 
recipient’s attorney.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4D–7.1(b). 
Taransky attempts to distinguish the Medicaid statute 
at issue in Lusby from the MSP Act, contending that 
Medicaid provided for an unqualified right to reimbursement, 
while the MSP Act requires the Government to demonstrate 
responsibility for payment. The Lusby court, however, was 
unconcerned with the unconditional nature of Medicaid’s 
reimbursement provision, and simply considered whether 
Medicaid’s payments were reimbursable. Taransky’s 
distinction is therefore unavailing. 
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Jackson v. Hudson Ct., LLC, No. L–415–07, 2010 WL 
2090036 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 24, 2010).
9
 There, in 
a case similar to Taransky’s, the Medicare beneficiary sought 
an order from the motions judge that no portion of her 
personal injury settlement was attributable to medical 
expenses. Id. at *1. On appeal, the Appellate Division 
affirmed the motions judge’s denial. Analogizing Lusby, the 
court found that Medicaid liens were “virtually identical to 
Medicare liens,” and that Medicare, as a secondary payer, 
“ha[d] a nearly unqualified right to reimbursement.” Id. at *3. 
Because of this reimbursement right, the claimant, even if she 
were able to recover medical expenses from another source, 
“could not pocket them and hence cannot obtain the ‘double 
recovery’ that the collateral source statute is designed to 
avoid.” Id. We predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would adopt this sound reasoning when considering the 
NJCSS’s application to Medicare liens.  
By contrast, only one case supports Taransky’s 
position: Early v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 01–cv–
5531 (D.N.J. July 28, 2003), in which the district court, in an 
unpublished opinion, ruled that Medicare benefits constituted 
a collateral source under the NJCSS. See JA at 208. There, 
the court found that the plaintiff had already recovered the 
cost of the victim’s medical treatment from Medicare, and 
concluded that the NJCSS precluded the plaintiff from 
obtaining the amount from the tortfeasor. See JA at 211.  
                                                 
9
 While unpublished opinions are not binding on New 
Jersey courts, see Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 
A.2d 650, 655 n.4 (N.J. 2010), we may refer to them when 
predicting state law. See Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 
994 F.2d 1039, 1042 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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While Early is certainly on point, we find the case 
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the decision turned on a 
flawed simplification of New Jersey law: the district court, in 
predicting how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule, 
held that the NJCSS “requires that tort judgments be reduced 
by the amount of any recovery from other sources.” Id. 
(emphasis added). This conclusion contradicted the holdings 
of prior intermediate court decisions, such as Lusby and 
Woodger, which received no attention in the opinion. Instead, 
the court relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision 
in Perreira v. Rediger, 778 A.2d 429, 432 (N.J. 2001), which 
focused on a very different question: whether a health 
insurance company could recover funds from a tortfeasor 
pursuant to the NJCSS. See JA at 210–11. The Perreira court 
held that the NJCSS barred an insurance company’s recovery 
because the statute aimed to shift the burden of payment from 
liability insurers to the health industry. See 778 A.2d at 436 
(citing, inter alia, Lusby, 642 A.2d at 1061). However, as 
Lusby made clear, this statutory purpose is not served when a 
beneficiary shifts the burden of payment from a tortfeasor to 
the government. See 642 A.2d at 1061. Second, the Early 
court relied in large part on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 500 (5th Cir. 2003), 
which held that the Medicare program could not be 
reimbursed from the proceeds of a tort settlement. See JA at 
211. Goetzmann, however, relied on the Fifth Circuit’s 
conclusion that tortfeasors were not a “primary plan” under 
the MSP Act—a conclusion that was abrogated by the 2003 
amendments to the statute for the reasons we explained in 
Section III.A, supra. 
Informed by the consistent line of Appellate Division 
decisions, and finding no persuasive rulings to the contrary, 
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we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold 
that Medicare payments, because of their conditional nature, 
do not constitute a collateral source of benefits under the 
NJCSS. Accordingly, Taransky may not rely on the NJCSS to 
avoid reimbursing the Government for Medicare payments it 
has made on her behalf.
10
 
2 
Taransky also argues that, regardless of our 
interpretation of the NJCSS, the Government must defer to 
the New Jersey Superior Court’s apportionment order in 
accordance with Medicare’s own regulations. Because the 
state court’s order provides that no portion of the settlement 
recovery is attributable to medical expenses, Taransky claims 
that she has no obligation to pay. 
Under the MSP Manual, “[t]he only situation in which 
Medicare recognizes allocations of liability payments to 
nonmedical losses is when payment is based on a court order 
on the merits of the case.” MSP Manual, Ch. 7, § 50.4.4 
(emphasis added). Further, “[i]f the court or other adjudicator 
of the merits specifically designate[s] amounts . . . not related 
to medical services, Medicare will accept the Court’s 
designation.” Id. In deference to the court’s substantive 
decision, “Medicare does not seek recovery from portions of 
court awards that are designated as payment for losses other 
than medical services.” Id. 
                                                 
10
 Because the NJCSS does not conflict with the MSP 
Act, the parties’ arguments regarding whether the Act 
preempts the NJCSS are moot. 
 23 
 
As the ALJ correctly found, the Superior Court’s 
apportionment order was not “on the merits,” and need not be 
recognized by the agency. A court order is “on the merits” 
when it is “delivered after the court has heard and evaluated 
the evidence and the parties’ substantive arguments.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary 1199 (9th ed. 2009); cf. Greene v. 
Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding, in a 
criminal case, that “on the merits” means the state court 
“acted on the substance of [the] claim”), aff’d sub nom. 
Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011); Thomas v. Horn, 570 
F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that state proceedings 
occur “on the merits” “when a state court has made a decision 
that 1) finally resolves the claim, and 2) resolves the claim on 
the basis of its substance”). Here, the state court did not 
adjudicate any substantive issue in the primary negligence 
suit. Indeed, in her motion for the order, Taransky clarified 
that she sought an apportionment not to resolve any 
outstanding issue in her suit, but “only to the extent necessary 
to obtain specified documentation relevant to anticipated 
administrative proceedings with the federal Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.” JA at 267. The state court, 
in effect, rubber stamped her request. Taransky’s motion was 
uncontested, issued pursuant to a stipulation between 
Taransky and Larchmont, and prepared and submitted by 
Taransky’s counsel for the judge’s signature. This order is the 
antithesis of one made on the merits. 
Taransky counters with four arguments, none of which 
we find persuasive. First, she contends that the agency’s 
definition of “on the merits” is improperly narrow because it 
ignores “‘merits’ determinations,” such as dismissal and 
summary judgment orders, “that do not involve a trial to 
verdict.” Taransky Br. at 23. But these orders involve an 
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adversarial exchange regarding the substance of a suit. By 
contrast, the allocation order in the present case was 
unopposed, the product of a prearranged agreement between 
Taransky and Larchmont. Taransky understandably wanted to 
maximize her recovery by excluding medical expenses from 
the settlement, and Larchmont, which had been insulated 
from further obligations pursuant to the terms of the 
settlement, was disinterested by that time. 
Second, Taransky faults the Government for failing to 
contest her allocation motion, claiming that the Government 
cannot “rely on [its] own inaction as the sole basis for 
criticizing the court’s ruling.” Taransky Br. at 25. We find 
this argument unavailing because, while Taransky notified 
her Medicare contractor of the motion, she never made the 
Government a party to her suit. Furthermore, neither the MSP 
Act nor its implementing regulations require the Government 
to intervene in state proceedings where such post-settlement 
allocation motions are made. 
Third, Taransky notes that the Medicare Appeals 
Council’s treatment of the Superior Court’s allocation order is 
inconsistent with previous determinations by QICs and 
ALJs
11
 that have recognized the validity of almost identical 
orders. But the Appeals Council is free to depart from these 
lower agency rulings without concern, as only its decisions 
have legal significance. “Nowhere does any policy or 
regulation suggest that the [Appeals Council] owes any 
                                                 
11
 As indicated supra note 3, the QIC constitutes the 
second level of appeal in the Medicare administrative process. 
An unsatisfied claimant then proceeds to the ALJ, the third 
level of appeal. 
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deference at all to—much less is bound by—decisions of 
lower reviewing bodies addressing different disputes between 
different parties.” Almy v. Sebelius, 679 F.3d 297, 310 (4th 
Cir. 2012). It is not arbitrary and capricious for the agency’s 
highest body “to make final determinations that may [be] at 
odds with prior . . . decisions that did not carry the full 
imprimatur of the Secretary’s authority.” Id. at 311. 
Taransky’s fourth argument—her strongest—cites 
Bradley v. Sebelius, 621 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2010), in which 
the Eleventh Circuit recognized a state court’s post-settlement 
allocation order as a judgment “on the merits.” Id. at 1339 
n.22. In that case, the plaintiffs (the children of the decedent 
and the decedent’s estate) challenged the Government’s right 
under the MSP Act to recover medical costs from the 
proceeds of a liability settlement. Id. at 1330. In a demand 
letter, the decedent’s children asserted claims for wrongful 
death against their father’s nursing home, alleging abuse and 
neglect under state law; the decedent’s estate separately 
sought damages for both wrongful death and medical costs. 
Id. at 1337 & n.13. The ensuing lump sum settlement of both 
suits was then apportioned between the children and the estate 
in a probate order. Id. at 1333–34. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the Medicare program 
could be reimbursed only from the amount of the settlement 
apportioned to the estate, as only the estate’s claims included 
medical expenses. Id. at 1337. By contrast, the Government 
could not demand reimbursement from the children’s 
settlement portion because their claims were distinct: they 
involved only “non-medical, tort property claims”—“a 
property right belonging to the child[, n]ot the Secretary.” Id. 
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the Government could 
not disregard the probate order, as it was an “allocation based 
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on a court order.” Id. at 1339 & n.22 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In a footnote, it noted that there were adverse 
parties: “the estate and children on one hand, and the 
Secretary on the other.” Id. at 1339 n.22. Similarly, the 
allocation decision was on the merits: “the merits of the 
Secretary’s position versus the merits of those of the estate 
and children.” Id. 
While this language in Bradley supports Taransky’s 
legal argument, we find that case factually distinguishable 
from this one. Here, Taransky was the sole claimant of the 
settlement funds. Unlike the decedent’s children in Bradley, 
Taransky pursued medical expenses as part of her tort suit. In 
addition, her motion sought to allocate her settlement among 
the various elements of damages in her suit, and not, as in 
Bradley, to apportion a lump sum amount between separate 
suits brought by distinct parties. Thus, unlike in Bradley, the 
state court here did not adjudicate a substantive issue (i.e., 
how funds should be divided between the parties before the 
court), and the Government here attempts only to be 
reimbursed from funds that were indisputably paid to a 
Medicare beneficiary. 
For these reasons, we hold that the Medicare Appeals 
Council did not err in finding that the state court’s order, 
which was entered upon a stipulation of the parties, did not 
constitute a court order on the merits of the case. 
Furthermore, given the substantial evidence supporting the 
Appeals Council’s finding that Taransky’s settlement 
included medical expenses, we conclude that she remains 
responsible for reimbursing the Government in spite of the 
Superior Court’s allocation order. 
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IV 
Having addressed Taransky’s colorable arguments, we 
turn only briefly to her remaining claims, which we dismiss 
out of hand for lack of jurisdiction. Taransky argues that, 
even if she is liable for her medical expenses, the “equity and 
good conscience” exception in 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(c) 
provides that the Government would be entitled not to full 
recovery of its payments, but only to a proportionate share of 
her recovery. Because Taransky never raised this argument 
before the agency, the District Court rightly held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to adjudicate it. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)–(h); see 
Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 
15 (2000) (“§ 405(g) contains the nonwaivable and 
nonexcusable requirement that an individual present a claim 
to the agency before raising it in court.”). 
Taransky responds that this argument need not be 
exhausted because she has not made a novel “‘claim’ for any 
benefits,” but merely presented “an example of a judicially-
endorsed method to resolve problems of equity and good 
conscience . . . —an issue specifically identified by [her] 
counsel in the administrative appeals process.”12 Taransky Br. 
at 37 n.10 (citation omitted). We disagree. During the 
administrative process, Taransky argued only that the 
                                                 
12
 Taransky makes this jurisdictional argument in a 
footnote, which is another reason why we refuse to consider it 
on the merits. See John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l 
Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments 
raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely 
argued, are considered waived.”).  
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Government could not recover its expenses at all—not that it 
erred in calculating the amount of its recovery. 
Second, Taransky argues that the District Court had 
jurisdiction over her due process claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, as the claim arises from the U.S. Constitution, not the 
Medicare Act. She clarifies that she is not challenging the 
agency’s adverse determination, but its actions “in 
implementing that administrative process”—specifically, that 
the agency “consistently ignore[s] the limitations of the [MSP 
Act], disregard[s] its own policies and procedures, and 
routinely exceed[s] [its] statutory authority by demanding 
repayment from beneficiaries without meeting the explicit 
statutory conditions required for reimbursement.” Taransky 
Br. at 53. 
The Medicare Act prevents courts from exercising 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when a claim “arises 
under” the statute—a concept that has been read broadly by 
the Supreme Court. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 
614–15 (1984) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii and 405(h)). 
A constitutional claim “arises under” the MSP Act when the 
statute “provides both the standing and the substantive basis 
for the presentation of [the plaintiffs’] constitutional 
contentions.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 758, 760–61 
(1975) (interpreting § 405(h) for the Social Security Act); 
Heckler, 466 U.S. at 615 (extending Weinberger to the 
Medicare Act).
13
 
                                                 
13
 A narrow exception to this general rule is when an 
agency provides “no review at all” for the claims at issue. See 
Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 19 (describing the exception to    § 
405(h) created by Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family 
 29 
 
That is the case here. Taransky’s constitutional claim 
is rooted in, and derived from, the Medicare Act. The premise 
of her constitutional claim—that the agency has “fail[ed] to 
follow the law controlling Medicare’s reimbursement rights,” 
Taransky Br. at 53—is an artful attempt to rephrase her 
primary argument, namely, that the agency has misinterpreted 
its right to reimbursement under the MSP Act. “To contend 
that such an action does not arise under the Act whose 
benefits are sought is to ignore both the language and the 
substance of the complaint and judgment.” Weinberger, 422 
U.S. at 761. Because Taransky’s due process claim “arises 
from” the MSP Act, the District Court did not err in requiring 
her to exhaust the claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 
before seeking judicial review.
14
 
                                                                                                             
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986)). The Michigan Academy 
exception does not apply here because administrative review 
of Taransky’s due process claim was available under 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g). 
14
 Taransky’s reliance on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976), to establish federal question jurisdiction is 
also misplaced. That case does not, as Taransky contends, set 
forth a blanket rule exempting due process challenges from 
exhaustion. Rather, Mathews notes that the agency may be 
deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement where the 
claimant’s constitutional challenge (i.e., entitlement to a pre-
deprivation hearing) was collateral to his substantive 
entitlement claim, and exhaustion (i.e., a post-deprivation 
hearing) rendered the constitutional argument futile. Id. at 
330–31. Here, Taransky’s due process claim is almost 
identical to her substantive argument, and there is no 
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V 
For the reasons stated, we hold that the MSP Act 
authorizes the Government to seek reimbursement from 
Taransky’s settlement, as she has received funds from a 
primary plan under the statute that has a demonstrated 
responsibility for her medical expenses. Taransky can invoke 
neither the NJCSS nor the Superior Court’s allocation order 
to avoid her reimbursement obligation, for the NJCSS did not 
prevent her from obtaining damages for medical expenses 
from Larchmont, and the Government need not recognize the 
allocation order because it was not on the merits. Finally, we 
hold that the District Court properly determined that it did not 
have jurisdiction over Taransky’s unexhausted proportionate 
payment and due process claims. We will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing Taransky’s suit. 
                                                                                                             
evidence that the agency cannot review the claim in the 
administrative process. 
